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THE FIDUCIARY CONTROVERSY: INJECTION
OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES INTO THE
BANK-DEPOSITOR AND BANK-
BORROWER RELATIONSHIPS
I. INTRODUCTION
Looking for a "deep pocket?" If so, you may be in luck. Courts
today are holding a particular industry liable on a variety of tort theories
and are awarding plaintiffs enormous verdicts, including large punitive
damage awards. No, this industry has nothing to do with the manufac-
turing of dangerous products or toxic pollutants. It is the banking indus-
try-an industry that throughout history has been considered a pillar of
the community.
Today banks are more commercially oriented than ever before and
soft-hearted juries have become more inclined to grant plaintiffs large
damage awards. For instance, recently in Texas a borrower received a
jury award of approximately $19 million against a group of lenders in an
action based on fraud, duress and interference.1 In the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the court recently reviewed a jury verdict in excess
of $10 million against a bank on claims of misrepresentation and breach
of fiduciary duty.' California juries have been especially generous. The
California Supreme Court recently affirmed a $1 million punitive dam-
ages verdict against a bank for fraudulent misrepresentation.3 Plaintiffs
have discovered a desirable "deep pocket," and banks are justifiably
concerned.
In the past, plaintiffs have asserted a wide variety of common-law
theories of liability against banks including: fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, excessive control, negligence, principal-agent, breach of contract,
lack of good faith and an assortment of intentional torts. However, in
recent litigation, the theory of tortious breach of fiduciary duty by the
1. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
2. In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986). In Letterman
Bros., the bank moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The district court granted
the bank's motion on the fiduciary claim. The court of appeals affirmed the district court,
holding that the financing bank owed no fiduciary duty to the investors. Id. at 975.
3. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 910, 701 P.2d 826, 839, 215 Cal. Rptr.
679, 692 (1985) (lender liable for misrepresenting that it would advance additional funds if
debtor assigned its accounts receivable to lender).
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bank has been successfully asserted by plaintiffs. Unfortunately, courts
have left banks with little guidance in trying to guess the basis for and
boundaries of the judicial imposition of such "fiduciary" duties to their
depositors and borrowers.
This Comment will focus on the recent and controversial injection
of fiduciary principles into ordinary "bank-depositor" 4 and "bank-bor-
rower" 5 relationships, and will expose the shaky ground upon which this
application of fiduciary principles is founded. This Comment will not
suggest that banks should never be regarded as fiduciaries to their cus-
tomers since there are several instances in which they are.6 Rather, the
author will explain fiduciary principles as they relate to banking, criti-
cally analyze two recent California appellate court cases which have mis-
applied such principles,7 and provide guidelines and suggestions that
courts should consider when deciding whether fiduciary principles are
present in a bank-depositor or bank-borrower relationship.
II. THE NATURE OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine
the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of
this court.'
This quote from Chief Judge Cardozo describes the strict and ex-
4. In the bank-depositor relationship the depositor (customer) transfers its money to the
bank. The bank becomes the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The bank promises to
pay out the depositor's funds only at the request of the depositor.
5. In the bank-borrower relationship the bank transfers its money to the borrower (cus-
tomer). The bank is now the creditor and the borrower is the debtor. The bank relies on the
borrower's promise to repay the funds entrusted to him.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 29-36.
7. Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986) (the bank-
borrower relationship); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,
209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (the bank-depositor relationship).
8. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (citations omitted).
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tremely burdensome duties undertaken by one who assumes the role of a
fiduciary. However, the term is not always applied with an understand-
ing of the duties and responsibilities described by the Chief Judge. The
concept of "fiduciary" is employed loosely by lawyers and courts in a
variety of contexts.
A. Fiduciary Defined
Though the term "fiduciary" is often used, the available literature
discussing this concept is relatively limited.9 "The term is derived from
the Roman law, and means a person holding the character of a trustee
... in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupu-
lous good faith and candor which it requires."' The dictionary defini-
tion of a fiduciary relationship illustratesg its potentially broad
interpretation and application. Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduci-
ary relationship as being founded on trust or confidence reposed by one
person "in the integrity and fidelity of another."" A fiduciary relation-
ship arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination
and influence result on the other. 2
The Restatement of Trusts states that a fiduciary "is under a duty to
act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the rela-
tion."13 Similarly, the Restatement of Torts provides that "[a] fiduciary
relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to
act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within
the scope of the relation."' 4
Another commentator offers the following synopsis of the history
and principles of fiduciary obligations: "A fiduciary relationship exists
9. Some of the literature includes: P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (1977); J. SHEP-
HERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); E. VINTER, HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIPS AND RESULTING TRUSTS (3d ed. 1955); D. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST: THE CASE FOR A NEW APPROACH IN ENGLISH LAW (1964); Hagedorn, Fiduciary
Aspects of the Bank-Customer Relationship, 34 Mo. B.J. 406 (1978); Hagedorn, The Impact of
Fiduciary Principles on the Bank-Customer Relationship in Washington, 16 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 803 (1980); Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries, 3
CARDOZO L. REv. 519 (1982); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539 (1949);
Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; Tettenborn, The Fiduciary Duties of
Banks, 1980 J. BUS. L. 10; Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (5th ed. 1979).
11. Id. at 564.
12. Id. A fiduciary "relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence and
trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of the other." Id.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959). The comment states that
a fiduciary "is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the other and not to enter into
competition with him without his consent ...." Id.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 comment a (1979).
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whenever any person acquires a power of any type on condition that he
also receive with it a duty to utilize that power in the best interests of
another, and the recipient of the power uses that power.""5 Unfortu-
nately, this summary provides no better guidance than the previous liter-
ature16 concerning which contracts or what aspects of those contracts
ought to be governed by fiduciary principles."7 Despite the clear defini-
tions of a fiduciary relationship, scholars and courts have not clearly es-
tablished how this relationship arises in any given context.
B. The Courts' Interpretation of Fiduciary
In 1983, the California Supreme Court helped clarify these various
definitions by holding that "[a] fiduciary.., assumes duties beyond those
of mere fairness and honesty... [and] must undertake to act on behalf of
the beneficiary, giving priority to the best interest of the beneficiary."' 8
However, the court proceeded with caution in deciding when fiduciary
obligations actually arose. It held that "before a person can be charged
with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on
behalf and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship
which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law."' 9
For the most part, California courts are reluctant to find fiduciary
relationships in commercial contexts. Courts will impose a fiduciary
duty only where the circumstances provide for an exception to the ordi-
nary expectation that each party to a commercial transaction will look
after his own interests.20 Mere "friendship or confidence in the profes-
sional skill and in the integrity and truthfulness of another" does not
15. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 9, at 96.
16. See supra note 10.
17. Jacobson, supra note 9, at 528 n.40.
18. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 222,
673 P.2d 660, 676, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 799 (1983). In Children's Television, the plaintiff al-
leged that General Foods owed a fiduciary obligation to child consumers, and breached that
duty through deceptive and misleading advertising in its marketing of sugared cereals. Id. at
204, 673 P.2d at 663-64, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87. The plaintiff also argued that imposition of
fiduciary obligations is appropriate whenever one party has a superior bargaining position or
greater knowledge of the facts. Id. at 221, 673 P.2d at 675, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 798. However,
the court held, "the efforts of commercial sellers--even those with superior bargaining
power-to profit from the trust of consumers is not enough to create a fiduciary duty. If it
were, the law of fiduciary relations would largely displace both the tort of fraud and much of
the Commercial Code." Id.
19. Id., 673 P.2d at 675-76, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 799; see Scott, supra note 9, at 540; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
20. Worldvision Enter., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 589, 594,
191 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151 (1983).
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trigger such an exception.2 1 Even close friends, when entering a business
transaction, exercise independent business judgment and act autono-
mously. The law will not impose a fiduciary duty on one party to act in
the other's best interests.22 The circumstances must show that the confi-
dence reposed and accepted decreases one party's ability or willingness to
act in its own self-interest.23
An analysis of the case law suggests that, in the bank-customer rela-
tionship, courts will find that a fiduciary relationship exists when two
elements are present: (1) the customer has reposed trust and confidence
in the bank; and (2) the bank has invited or accepted such trust and
confidence. However, this Comment suggests that fiduciary principles
should not be applied to ordinary commercial transactions. Imposition
of fiduciary obligations in bank-depositor or bank-borrower relationships
creates a serious conflict of interest for the bank. Banks are private com-
mercial enterprises, engaged in financial activity for the purpose of mak-
ing money. If a bank is labeled a fiduciary, its power to transact business
with its customer is severely limited. The California Supreme Court held
that a fiduciary "must use the utmost good faith and, if he profits from
the transaction, the law presumes the agreement was entered into by the
beneficiary 'without sufficient consideration and under undue in-
fluence.' "24
Based on this holding, a profit minded institution such as a bank
could not protect its own best interests while under a fiduciary duty to
act for the benefit of the customer-giving priority to the customer's best
interests.25 If courts intend to introduce fiduciary principles into a bank-
customer relationship, "they will need to decide whether its importation
into the banker and customer context is really appropriate, clarify the
meaning of fiduciary and distinguish it from other similar legal
principles."
2 6
21. Wilson v. Zorb, 15 Cal. App. 2d 526, 532, 59 P.2d 593, 596 (1936); see also 1 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CoNTRACm § 320 (8th ed. 1973).
22. See Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 750-51, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321-22
(1972) (no confidential relationship found between two parties to a real estate transaction who
were long-term friends because buyers, although naive, exercised independent judgment); see
also infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
23. See Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1983);
Dolton v. Capital Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
24. Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 222, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (citation
omitted) (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 2235 (West 1985)).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
26. Ogilvie, Banks, Advice-Giving and Fiduciary Obligation, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 263,
292-93 (1985).
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III. THE BANK AS A FIDUCIARY
It has generally been held that "[tihe relationship of debtor and
creditor without more is not a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary rela-
tionship may be created ... only when both parties understand that a
special trust or confidence has been reposed."27 The mere rendering of
advice and counseling by a lending institution to a customer is not suffi-
cient by itself to create a fiduciary relationship.28
A. Situations Where Banks are Accepted as Fiduciaries
Banks have invited and accepted the title of fiduciary in certain con-
texts. For example, banks often establish trust departments that are gov-
erned by statutory and common law fiduciary principles. 29 The bank, as
a trustee, must abide by the law of trusts-acting solely in the interests of
the customer or beneficiary.
3 °
In addition, banks have been regarded as fiduciaries in certain "con-
trol creditor" cases. As a lender, the bank may become a control credi-
tor by becoming so involved in the borrower's daily operations that the
bank has, in effect, dominated the borrower to the extent that the bor-
rower has lost its separate identity.31 In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec-
tric Co., the United States Supreme Court held that a lender who
assumes a "controlling" position vis-a-vis its borrower may occupy a fi-
duciary position to both the borrower and the borrower's other credi-
tors.32 In this situation, "a non-insider creditor [bank] will be held to a
fiduciary standard only where his ability to command the debtor's obedi-
ence to his policy directives is so overwhelming that there has been, to
some extent, a merger of identity. '33 Before imposing fiduciary duties
27. Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323
(1979); see also Guffey v. Washburn, 382 Ill. 376, 46 N.E.2d 971 (1943); Hoover v. Cooke, 566
S.W.2d 19 (rex. Civ. App. 1978); Annotation, Banks as Fiduciary-Duty of Disclosure, 70
A.L.R.3D 1344 (1976 & Supp. 1986).
28. Umbaugh, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 286, 390 N.E.2d at 323; see also Stenberg v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976). For a discussion of Stenberg, see infra
text accompanying notes 71-73.
29. See Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914) (common-law duty for fiduciary to act
"solely" in the interest of the beneficiary); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 170(1)
(1959) ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary.").
30. See generally Tyler v. State, 134 Cal. App. 3d 973, 185 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1982);
Pethebridge v. Prudential Say. & Loan Ass'n, 79 Cal. App. 3d 509, 145 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1978).
31. See Schechter, The Principal Principle: Controlling Creditors Should Be Held Liable
For Their Debtors' Obligations, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 875, 878-80 (1986).
32. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
33. In re Teltronics Servs., 29 Bankr. 139, 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
FIDUCIARY CONTROVERSY
upon a bank in a control creditor situation, the court will generally re-
quire that the bank is, "in effect, the alter ego of the debtor.
'
)
34
In a commercial loan,
banks must recognize that once it is established that they are in
control of a borrower's business, whether through the exercise
of rights granted in the loan, . . . through exercise of voting
control, . . . through participation on the borrower's board of
directors, or otherwise, they might have a fiduciary responsibil-
ity to the borrower's shareholders and can be held responsible
for any resulting mismanagement of the company.35
In determining whether a creditor has gained control of a debtor, courts
consider several factors, including: financial dependence; restrictive cov-
enants within the agreement; control over disbursements; and other re-
strictions indicative of control.36
When the bank acts as a trustee, or assumes a control creditor posi-
tion with regard to the borrower, the borrower is entirely dependent on
the bank and the bank undertakes to advise, counsel and protect the bor-
rower. In the trustee and control creditor relationships, the courts are
willing to impose, and banks are willing to accept, the role of a fiduciary
and the special burdens and obligations that accompany that role. How-
ever, this gross imbalance of power and expectation of fiduciary obliga-
tions present in the trustee and control creditor relationships is non-
existent in ordinary bank-depositor and bank-borrower relationships and
therefore courts should not impose fiduciary obligations upon banks in
such contexts.
B. The Bank-Depositor Relationship
In the ordinary bank-depositor relationship, where the depositor
places his money in the bank in return for the bank's promise to pay out
the money at his request, the bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. "This is the 'standard' deposit contract presumed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code."37 The customer perceives the bank as a
34. Id.
35. Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103
BANKING L.J. 220, 241 (1986). For a discussion of a controlling creditor's liability under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 207-08, 284 (1985); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 441-56 (1983).
36. Kunkel, The Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interference with Farm
Management, 60 N.D.L. REv. 445, 453-62 (1984); see also Schechter, supra note 31.
37. 2 T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 12A-4 (1986).
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"bailee" 38 of the deposited funds.
In 1906, the California Supreme Court established that the relation-
ship between bank and depositor is merely that of debtor and creditor.39
The court held that "the customer can never hold or charge the bank as a
trustee, quasi-trustee, factor, or agent."'  Courts in California and those
in other jurisdictions employ similar reasoning by holding that the rela-
tionship of a bank to its depositors is that of debtor and creditor, and is
not a fiduciary relationship. 41 For example, the court in Morse v.
Crocker National Bank 2 held that a deposit, in effect, is a loan to the
bank-the bank is obligated to pay the debt.43 Although the bank holds
the depositor's money, the court stated that it does not act as a trustee or
incur the fiduciary obligations of a trustee.' 4 The United States Supreme
Court also adopted this rule, concluding that the "relationship of bank
and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract."4
Inherent in a contractual relationship is the assumption that each
party to the contract will protect its own interests. Accordingly, this
inherent assumption must also apply in the "contractual" bank-depositor
relationship. Because there is no reposing of trust and confidence in the
bank by the depositor nor an invitation or acceptance of such by the
38. Black's Law Dictionary defines bailee as "one to whom goods are bailed; the party to
whom personal property is delivered. A species of agent to whom something movable is com-
mitted in trust for another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (5th ed. 1979).
39. Smiths' Cash Store v. First Natl Bank, 149 Cal. 32, 84 P. 663 (1906) (action by depos-
itor against bank for damages to its credit resulting from bank's refusal to pay checks drawn
upon it by depositor).
40. Id. at 34-35, 84 P. at 664; see also State ex rel. Rankin v. Banking Corp., 77 Mont. 134,
251 P. 151 (1926).
41. Lawrence v. Bank of Am., 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 437, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1985)
("Under ordinary circumstances the relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of
debtor-creditor, and is not a fiduciary one."); Morse v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d
228, 232, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1983) ("It is axiomatic that the relationship between a bank
and its depositor ... is that of a debtor and creditor."); see also Basch v. Bank of Am., 22 Cal.
2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40,
218 P. 424 (1923); Estate of Collins, 84 Cal. App. 3d 928, 149 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1978); Wright v.
Bank of Cal., 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1969); Home Escrow Serv. Corp. v.
County, 155 Cal. App. 2d 335, 317 P.2d 1021 (1957); Duggan v. Hopkins, 147 Cal. App. 2d
67, 304 P.2d 823 (1956); Manson State Bank v. Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1976); Davis
Bros. & Potter v. Fort Dodge Nat'l Bank, 216 Iowa 277, 249 N.W. 170 (1933); Katt v. First
State Bank, 206 Iowa 252, 220 N.W. 318 (1928); Dugan v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 Kan. 201, 606
P.2d 1009 (1980).
42. 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1983).
43. Id. at 232, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
44. Id.; see also Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 357 n.3, 521 P.2d 441, 443
n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 451 n.3 (1974); Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 123, 129-31, 507 P.2d
609, 614-16, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-7 (1973); Ogborn v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 28
Cal. App. 2d 565, 568, 83 P.2d 44, 45-46 (1938).
45. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966).
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bank, there is no basis to impose fiduciary obligations upon the bank.4 6
C. The Bank-Borrower Relationship
In the bank-borrower relationship the roles of debtor and creditor
are reversed; the bank lends its money in return for the borrower's prom-
ise to repay.4' The bank is now the creditor and the borrower the debtor.
Like the bank-depositor relationship, it is an established principle that
the relationship between the bank and its borrower is that of debtor and
creditor and does not give rise to fiduciary responsibilities. 48 Unfortu-
nately, recent cases have muddled these distinctions leaving the status of
the bank in a bank-borrower relationship unclear and creating conflicts
among jurisdictions.
The most often cited, and perhaps the most important decision con-
cerning this issue is the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Klein v.
First Edina National Bank.49 In Klein, the plaintiff sued when her bank
foreclosed on stock she pledged as collateral for a loan the bank granted
to her employer. Unaware that her employer already owed the bank
$9,250 and that the bank intended to rely entirely on the plaintiff's stock
as security for both loans, the plaintiff alleged fraud based on the bank's
failure to inform her of all the details of the transactions.50 Although a
bank is generally under no fiduciary duty to the borrower, the Klein
court held that special circumstances may exist requiring the bank to
disclose certain material facts:
We believe the correct rule to be that when a bank trans-
acts business with a depositor or other customer, it has no spe-
cial duty to counsel the customer and inform him of every
material fact relating to the transaction... unless special cir-
cumstances exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason
to know that the customer is placing his trust and confidence in
the bank and is relying on the bank so to counsel and inform
him."
The Klein court found that the "special circumstances" required for
46. See supra text accompanying notes 10-26 for a discussion of the "fiduciary" concept.
47. T. EISENBERG, supra note 37, at 12A-4.
48. See, e.g., In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 699 F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1983); Manson State Bank v. Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1976); Denison State
Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982); State ex rel. Rankin v. Banking Corp.,
77 Mont. 134, 251 P. 11 (1926).
49. 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972).
50. Id. at 421, 196 N.W.2d at 621-22.
51. Id. at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 623.
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imposing a special duty on the bank were absent in the case before it. 2
The plaintiff had been a customer of the bank for nearly twenty years,
and she testified that she trusted the bank's representatives just as she
would a doctor or a lawyer. The court nevertheless found no evidence in
the record to indicate that the bank knew or should have known that the
plaintiff was placing her trust and confidence in the bank. 3
1. Cases cited to support a fiduciary relationship
Various courts cite cases similar to Klein to support a finding of
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of a bank. However, most of these
cases focused on fraud or a duty to disclose rather than breach of fiduci-
ary duty. For example, in First National Bank in Lennox v. Brown,54 the
Supreme Court of Iowa held that a party in a position of trust, who has
superior knowledge of the facts, has a duty to disclose all material facts
of which he is aware, or at least those favorable to his position and ad-
verse to the other.55 In Brown, the bank negotiated a purchase money
loan with Brown but failed to reveal that a major portion of the loan
would be used to erase the bank's lien on the property being transferred.
The court stated that bank-borrower loan agreements are not arms-
length transactions; rather "there exists a relationship of trust or confi-
dence" and the bank "has superior knowledge of the facts."56 Unlike
Klein, the Brown court held that there was imposed upon the bank an
"unfulfilled duty of disclosure"-because the bank had far more familiar-
ity with the operative facts of the transaction than did Brown. 7 The
Brown court, however, failed to support its conclusion that a relationship
of trust and confidence existed between the bank and its borrower. The
court made no reference to a reposing of trust and confidence upon the
bank, nor to the bank's acceptance or knowledge of such trust and
confidence.
In Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank58 the Arizona Supreme Court
became one of the first courts to determine that "the relation between
plaintiff [customer] and defendant [bank] was far beyond that of a mere
52. Id. There was "no evidence in the record to indicate that defendant ought to have
known that plaintiff was placing her trust and confidence in defendant and was depending
upon defendant to look out for her interests." Id.
53. Id.
54. 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970).
55. Id. at 182.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
FIDUCIARY CONTROVERSY
debtor and creditor."59 In Stewart, the plaintiff was a customer of the
bank for about twenty-three years and relied on the directors and officers
of the bank for financial advice. Previously, plaintiff had borrowed large
sums of money from the bank, giving no security. By 1931, the plaintiff
owed the bank $17,800. In order to secure the notes, the bank requested
from plaintiff a mortgage on real estate he owned as security for the debt.
The plaintiff alleged that the bank requested the mortgage with the "in-
tent to deceive and defraud plaintiff out of his property."6 ° Additionally,
the plaintiff claimed that the bank officers, knowing that he would rely
upon their representations, "wilfully and wickedly and falsely repre-
sented to the plaintiff that it did not want his property."61 In holding for
the plaintiff, the court noted that in 1937 changes were under way in the
banking industry:
Banks ... were originally merely places of security where a
man might deposit his cash and valuables .... But times have
changed... . [I]n many, if not most, cases an investor will
consult his bank... believing that he has the right to rely upon
the advice of its officers as being given in good faith.62
Stewart represented the beginning of a movement away from the
general rule of the bank-borrower relationship as a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. It was the first in a number of cases recognizing the change in
consumer attitudes towards the banking industry. However, it appears
to be a minority position; the general rule still characterizes the bank-
borrower relationship as that of debtor-creditor.
Under Montana law, it is an established principle that the relation-
ship between a bank and its customer is that of debtor and creditor and
does not give rise to fiduciary responsibilities.63 Nevertheless, in Deist v.
Wachholz," the Montana Supreme Court recognized an exception to this
principle. The court held that "modem banking practices involve a
highly complicated structure of credit and other complexities which
often thrust a bank into the role of an advisor, thereby creating a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence which may result in a fiduciary duty
upon the bank ... ,"' Whether a bank owes fiduciary duties to a loan
59. Id. at 44, 64 P.2d at 106.
60. Id. at 40, 64 P.2d at 104.
61. Id. at 41, 64 P.2d at 104.
62. Id. at 45, 64 P.2d at 106.
63. See, e.g., Rankin, 77 Mont. 134, 251 P. 151.
64. 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984).
65. Id. at 193 (quoting Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 33 Wash. App. 456,
656 P.2d 1089 (1983)).
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customer depends upon "proof of a special relationship. 66
In Deist, the plaintiff associated with the same bank for about
twenty-four years. During that time, the bank acted as the plaintiff's
financial advisor, causing the plaintiff to rely upon its counsel. The dis-
pute arose when the plaintiff's husband died leaving her with a $200,000
debt from a ranch they owned. The president of the bank, a family
friend, advised the plaintiff to sell the property. Defendant Wachholz, a
vice president of the bank, had the duty of finding a buyer. Wachholz
found a buyer who negotiated a purchase with the plaintiff. A few days
later the plaintiff learned that Wachholz was in partnership with the
buyer. The contract, however, failed to indicate that Wachholz or any
other buyers were involved. The plaintiff's complaint sought rescission
of the contract and damages against the bank and Wachholz based on an
alleged breach of a fiduciary duty.67 The court held that the bank was
bound to insure that the plaintiff was not "'insufficiently informed of
some factor which could affect [plaintiff's] judgment.' "68 While not dis-
missing the general notion that the bank-depositor relationship is that of
debtor-creditor, the court determined there were exceptions in certain
situations.6 9 The court concluded that by failing to inform the plaintiff of
Wachholz' involvement with the purchaser, the bank breached its fiduci-
ary duty to the plaintiff.7 °
Courts finding a fiduciary relationship to exist between a bank and
its borrowers base their holding on an assumption of a "special relation-
ship." Unfortunately, these courts often assumed a special relationship
existed, rather than requiring proof of its existence.
2. Cases holding "no fiduciary relationship"
Several jurisdictions have adopted the Klein holding that a bank will
66. Id.
67. Id at 192.
68. Id. at 195 (quoting Lloyds Bank, Ltd. v. Bundy, 3 All E.R. 757 (CA. 1974)). The
bank in Deist had an obligation to inform plaintiff fully and to do nothing that would place the
plaintiff at a disadvantage. Id.
69. Id. at 193. The court suggested that:
[One] who speaks must say enough to prevent his words from misleading the
other party; one who has special knowledge of material facts to which the other party
does not have access may have a duty to disclose these facts to the other party; and
one who stands in a confidential or fiduciary relation to the other party ... must
disclose other facts.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 33 Wash. App. 456,
656 P.2d 1089 (1983)).
70. Id. at 194. The court found that because the bank acted as the plaintiff's financial
advisor, and the plaintiff undoubtedly relied upon their counsel, the officers of the bank owed
to plaintiff a fiduciary duty-and that fiduciary duty extended to Wachholz. Id.
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generally have no special duty to counsel and inform the customer unless
the bank knows or has reason to know that the customer is justifiably
placing trust and confidence in the bank. For instance, in Stenberg v.
Northwestern National Bank of Rochester,71 the Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they "relied" upon the bank's
advice in a loan arrangement. The Stenbergs, owners of a small wood
products company, wished to expand their business. To finance this ex-
pansion, the Stenbergs opened a line of credit with the bank. When their
indebtedness increased, the bank encouraged them to seek a loan from
the Small Business Administration of the federal government in order to
consolidate and reduce their debt to the bank. A bank officer assured the
Stenbergs that their relationship with the bank would help their business
grow and that they should not worry about their increasing indebtedness.
Claiming they relied upon the bank's advice, the Stenbergs sued the
bank, in a fiduciary capacity, for misrepresentations made to them.
The court rejected the Stenbergs' assertion, holding that the evi-
dence would not support a "basis for plaintiffs' claim that a fiduciary
relationship existed between plaintiffs and defendants. 72 The court de-
termined that Mr. Stenberg was a businessman, "capable of independent
judgment" and concluded that no basis existed for an exception to the
general rule that a bank owes no special duty to its borrowers.73
In Denison State Bank v. Madeira,74 the Supreme Court of Kansas
described a fiduciary relationship as follows:
A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar con-
fidence placed by one individual in another. A fiduciary is a
person with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another.
A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise, and does have
and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary relationship
implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over the
other. Generally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, in-
terest or authority of the other is placed in the charge of the
fiduciary.75
71. 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976).
72. Id. at 488, 238 N.W.2d at 219.
73. Id.; see MacKenzie v. Summit Nat'1 Bank, 363 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. App. 1985); see
infra note 180 for a discussion of MacKenzie.
74. 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982).
75. Id. at 692, 640 P.2d at 1241 (citing 36A CJ.S. Fiduciary (1961)). The court in Denison
cited an early appellate court case to show some definitive elements that are relevant in deter-
mining whether a fiduciary relationship exists: "There is no invariable rule which determines
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, but it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be
not only confidence of the one in the other, but there must exist a certain inequality ... giving
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Denison involved a bank suing to recover the balance due on three
promissory notes executed by the defendant and guaranteed by his wife.
The defendant counterclaimed for damages alleging that the bank fraud-
ulently obtained the notes while under a fiduciary duty to the defendant.
The defendant alleged that the bank made false representations of fact
regarding the loans and that the bank intentionally failed to disclose its
knowledge of key financial statements and the status of its loan to a perti-
nent party.76
Previously, in Dugan v. First National Bank,7 7 the Kansas Supreme
Court had established that "Kansas recognizes the general rule that the
relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of creditor-debtor
and not of a fiduciary."' 78 The Denison court held that the facts "[did]
not take it out of the general rule and are insufficient to support a finding
of a fiduciary relationship. '79 The court reasoned that "one may not
abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and unilat-
erally impose a fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious as-
sumption of such duties by the one sought to be held as a fiduciary."80
The court determined that the defendant could not avoid responsibility
for exercising diligence for his own protection by simply relying on the
bank to provide him with information he never requested. Like the court
in Stenberg, the Denison court held that the defendant was "fully compe-
tent and able to protect his own interests."81
In a more recent case, Kurth v. Van Horn,82 the Supreme Court of
Iowa also observed the general rule that "a fiduciary duty or confidential
relationship does not arise solely from a bank-depositor relationship."8 3
The plaintiff in Kurth argued that the rule should be different when a
customer becomes a borrower. However, the court determined that, in
to one advantage over the other." Id. (quoting Yuster v. Keefe, 46 Ind. App. 460,466, 90 N.E.
920, 922 (1910)).
76. Id. at 687, 640 P.2d at 1238. The pertinent party was the owner of a General Motors
dealership which the defendant was seeking to buy into. The owner did business at Denison
State Bank, was heavily indebted to the bank, and the officers of the bank were aware of his
financial difficulties. Defendant contended that the bank breached its fiduciary duty by failing
to make full disclosure of the dealership owner's financial involvement with the bank. Id. at
686-87, 640 P.2d at 1237-38.
77. 227 Kan. 201, 606 P.2d 1009 (1980).
78. Id. at 207, 606 P.2d at 1014.
79. Denison, 230 Kan. at 695, 640 P.2d at 1243.
80. Id. at 696, 640 P.2d at 1243-44.
81. Id., 640 P.2d at 1244. The defendant could have acquired the allegedly concealed facts
through reasonable effort. This view is consistent with finding parties to a contract able to
defend themselves. See infra text accompanying notes 185-91.
82. 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986).
83. Id. at 696.
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such situations, there was no fiduciary relationship between the bank and
its customer. In Kurth, Mr. Gerdes (deceased) cosigned a note in con-
nection with a bank loan to Mr. Hall (a farmer who asked Gerdes to help
him get a loan). The loan was secured by a mortgage on farmland owned
by Gerdes. Plaintiff, the trustee of Gerdes' estate, sued the bank alleging
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff claimed that a fiduciary re-
lationship existed between the bank and Gerdes because Gerdes was
eighty years old, was under pressure by Hall to secure the loan, made
several visits with Hall to the bank, and was not advised of Hall's finan-
cial problems of which the bank had knowledge.
Considering Hall's financial background, Gerdes was clearly ill-ad-
vised to cosign the loan. The court, however, rejected the plaintiff's sug-
gestion that the bank should have refused to conclude the loan until
Gerdes secured legal counsel. "[T]his form of protectionism goes far be-
yond the exercise of the banker's responsibility... and its failure to do so
does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. The bank had no affirma-
tive duty to prevent Gerdes from doing what the evidence clearly shows
he wanted to do."84 In the wake of Klein, the Kurth court held that
although there was an alleged reposing of trust and confidence by the
customer, there was no substantial evidence to show that the customer
relied on the bank's advice, or that if he did rely, the bank was aware of
such reliance.85
Most jurisdictions have accepted the general proposal of Klein and
similar cases that a bank generally has no fiduciary duty to a borrower
unless there is confidence justifiably reposed by the customer and the
bank invites, accepts, knows or has reason to know that the customer is
placing his trust and confidence in it.86 However, recent California deci-
sions have cast aside this rule and held banks to fiduciary standards
where a careful analysis would reveal that the imposition of fiduciary
duties was completely unwarranted. This Comment will now examine
several cases in an effort to illustrate how these courts have strayed from
established fiduciary principles concerning bank-depositor and bank-bor-
rower relationships.
84. Id. at 697.
85. Id. at 698.
86. It should be noted that although Klein set up the special rule for finding a fiduciary
duty, it held:
The fact that plaintiff had done business with defendant for nearly 20 years could not
by itself place defendant in a confidential relation to plaintiff. Nor could the fact that
plaintiff had occasionally socialized with the wife of defendant's president somehow
change the character of defendant's relation to plaintiff into a fiduciary one.
Klein, 293 Minn. at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 623.
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IV. CALIFORNIA'S RECENT APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
TO BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS
The previous discussion of case law reveals that the concept of fidu-
ciary obligation in the bank-customer relationship is at best confusing.
Although several state supreme courts have addressed this issue, none
has provided adequate guidelines or standards establishing when a fiduci-
ary relationship arises. Recently, one California appellate court has ren-
dered controversial decisions in both the bank-depositor and bank-
borrower contexts. This Comment will show that these cases are not
sound decisions in establishing that the ordinary bank-depositor or bank-
borrower relationship gives rise to fiduciary responsibilities.
A. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank-The Bank-
Depositor Relationship
1. Facts and application of law
In Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank,87 a California
court held that the relationship between a bank and its depositor is at
least "quasi-fiduciary." 88 The court reached this conclusion by finding
that banking is a highly regulated industry performing a vital public ser-
vice and that the depositor is totally dependent on the bank's honesty to
protect the deposited funds.89
In Commercial Cotton, the plaintiff, a customer of United California
Bank (UCB), advised UCB that it had lost some of its checks. However,
the plaintiff failed to place stop orders on these missing checks or close
the account. Four years later, one of the missing checks, bearing unau-
thorized signatures, was deposited with another bank and processed by
UCB. Eighteen months later, Commercial Cotton discovered that the
check had been negotiated and demanded its account be re-credited.
UCB declined, citing as a defense the one-year limitation on bringing
such claims.9 0 Commercial Cotton brought a tort action against UCB
claiming that UCB breached its "implied covenant of good faith and fair
87. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
88. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
89. Id.
90. CAL. COM. CODE § 4406 (West 1964). Section 4406 provides that:
Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank a
customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items are
made available to the customer (subdivision (1)) discover and report his unauthor-
ized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item or any unauthorized
indorsement. . . is precluded from asserting against the bank such unauthorized
signature or indorsement or such alteration.
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dealing"9 1 by asserting spurious defenses 92 to avoid liability.93
The Commercial Cotton court held that UCB should have been
91. In California, it has been established that the law implies in every contract a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24
Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426
P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878
(1949) (contract recovery for breach of implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing under
agreement to make mutual wills); Cordonier v. Central Shopping Plaza Assocs., 82 Cal. App.
3d 991, 147 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978) (breach of the implied covenant in leases); Osborne v. Cal-
Am Fin. Corp., 80 Cal. App. 3d 259, 145 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1978) (breach of the implied cove-
nant in agreements to sell real property); Masonite Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 65 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 135 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1976) (breach of the implied covenant in contract to provide
utility services). Broadly stated, the covenant requires that neither party do anything which
will deprive the other of the benefits of the agreement.
California courts have recognized the existence of this covenant in a wide variety of con-
tract cases. In insurance and employment cases, the California Supreme Court has held that a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may give rise to a cause of action
in tort as well as in contract. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (court intimated that breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment relationship might give rise to tort remedies--comparing
the relationship with the insured-insurer relationship); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing could give rise to damages in tort); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (insurer who wrongfully declines to defend and refuses to accept a
reasonable settlement within policy limits violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and is liable for entire judgment, even if it exceeds the policy limits); Hannon Eng'g,
Inc. v. Reim, 126 Cal. App. 3d 415, 179 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1981) (unwarranted delay by an em-
ployer in honoring employees' request for payment of pension is a tortious breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, emphasizing the adhesive nature of the
employment contract); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980) (employer's discharge of a senior employee for union activities may result in tort
liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (disability insurer's bad faith
refusal to make payment under policy constituted breach of implied covenant entitling insured
to contract damages, emotional distress damages and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages);
see also Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Inforex
Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 608 F. Supp. 129 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
92. In Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, the California
Supreme Court held that a contracting party seeking to avoid liability by adopting a "stone-
wall" position without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a defense may be
sued in tort because it has done more than merely breach the contract. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d
at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. "Acceptance of tort remedies in such a situation is not likely to
intrude upon the bargaining relationship or upset reasonable expections [sic] of the contracting
parties." Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
In Seaman's, a dispute arose out of a contractual agreement between a ship supply dealer
and an oil supplier. The parties made a dealership agreement under which the supplier was to
supply the ship dealer's fuel requirements. The oil dealer subsequently denied the existence of
the contract. The court held that "a party to a contract may incur tort remedies when, in
addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad
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aware of a recent California Supreme Court case94 in which the court
determined that the one-year statutory limitations relied upon by the
bank does not apply when a customer sues a bank for negligent con-
duct.9 5 The court relied on Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 96 which found that tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing arises if (1) a special relationship exists
between the parties (i.e., insured-insurer relationship), or (2) one party
denies, in bad faith, the existence of the contract. The Commercial Cot-
ton court upheld the trial court's finding that UCB breached its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court stated, "UCB's
claimed defenses are spurious,... legal counsel interposing them in an
unjustifiable, stonewalling effort to prevent an innocent depositor from
recovering money entrusted to and lost through the bank's own negli-
gence."97 Accordingly, the court found UCB liable in tort because the
evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that UCB breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the plaintiff.98
Unfortunately, the Commercial Cotton court did not base its holding
on the bad faith denial rationale. Instead, the court introduced "fiduci-
ary principles" into its rationale for establishing tortious breach of the
faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 363.
The court in Seaman's left the door open for finding tort remedies in a commercial con-
text, but it stated, "it is wise to proceed with caution in determining their scope and applica-
tion." Id.
93. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
94. Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1978).
95. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 515, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553. In Sun 'N Sand,
an employee of the plaintiff had, over a three year period, secured corporate signatures on
checks payable to United California Bank (UCB). UCB allegedly had transferred the checks
or permitted the checks to be transferred to the employee's personal account and charged them
to plaintiff's account. The employee concealed her embezzlement. The plaintiff brought an
action against UCB claiming mistake, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence and warranty
against alteration. UCB claimed that Sun 'N Sand was precluded from asserting claims
against the bank by the one-year statute of limitations of California Commercial Code § 4406
subd. (4). See supra note 90 for the text of California Commercial Code § 4406.
The court held that the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff created a duty of care on
the part of UCB, thus permitting a negligence action. Sun 'NSand, 21 Cal. 3d at 692-98, 582
P.2d at 935-40, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 344-47. The court concluded that subdivision (4) of § 4406
applies only to warranty actions. Id. at 699, 582 P.2d at 940, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The court
therefore applied the three-year statute of limitations of California Civil Code § 338(3) for
negligent injury to property. Id. at 700, 582 P.2d at 940, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
96. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354. See supra note 92 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Seaman's.
97. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
98. Id.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court held, "[t]he relation-
ship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary, and depositors rea-
sonably expect a bank not to claim nonexistent legal defenses to avoid
reimbursement when the bank negligently disburses the entrusted
funds."99
By finding tort liability based on a special relationship between the
parties, this unparalleled holding established that any breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by a bank exposed it not
only to contractual remedies, but also to the full range of tort remedies,
including punitive damages. To support its holding for such a tort action
based on fiduciary principles, the court in Commercial Cotton cited the
only line of cases which have authorized such a claim for damages in a
contractual setting-insurance cases. 10° In the context of insurance con-
tracts, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that the relation-
ship between the insurer and the insured is characterized by elements of
public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility. 101
In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 102 the California
Supreme Court set forth the factors which establish a "special relation-
ship" necessary before a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing can be alleged as a tort. Analogizing to those factors, the Com-
mercial Cotton court held that "banking and insurance have much in
common, both being highly regulated industries performing vital public
services substantially affecting the public welfare."103 As a result of this
reasoning, the court in Commercial Cotton became the first court to hold
that the relationship between a bank and its depositor is at least "quasi-
fiduciary. '"" By introducing fiduciary principles into the bank-deposi-
tor relationship, the Commercial Cotton court may have opened the pro-
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing could give rise to damages in tort); Comunale, 50 Cal.
2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (insurer who wrongfully declines to defend and who refuses to accept a
reasonable settlement within the policy limits violates the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and is liable for the entire judgment, even if it exceeds the policy limits); Fletcher,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (disability insurer's bad faith refusal to make payment
under a policy constituted breach of implied covenant entitling insured to contract damages,
emotional distress damages and, in appropriate eases, punitive damages).
101. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482. The court in Egan set out
the factors which create the necessary "special relationship" to establish a claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr.
at 487.
102. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482.
103. Commercial Cotton, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
104. Id.
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verbial "floodgates" for tort liability against the banking industry where
it did not exist in the traditional debtor-creditor relationship.
2. Critique of Commercial Cotton
In Commercial Cotton, the court introduced the notion that the rela-
tionship between a bank and its depositor is at least "quasi-fiduciary"
because banking is a highly regulated industry, affected with the public
interest, performing a vital public service and the depositor is totally de-
pendent on the bank's "honesty and expertise" to protect the deposited
funds.105 However, Commercial Cotton violates established precedent,
including California Supreme Court decisions, which have held that the
relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor-creditor
and not a fiduciary.' °6 The court's decision in Commercial Cotton is both
unparalleled and unsupported.
a. insurance vs. deposit contracts
To hold that the bank tortiously breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the court in Commercial Cotton had to establish that the
requisite "special relationship" existed between the bank and the deposi-
tor. 10 7 The court's holding that the bank is a "quasi-fiduciary" is entirely
inconsistent with previous decisions.' 8 This fiduciary duty has never
been endorsed by the California Supreme Court except in circumstances
inherent in insurance and employment contracts.10 9
The insurance cases emphasize that:
(a) the purpose of an insurance policy is not to obtain a
"commercial advantage" but to secure both protection against
calamity and peace of mind, (b) insurers serve a quasi-public
function which requires them to consider the public interest in
addition to the profit motive, (c) insurers enjoy a superior bar-
gaining position over their insureds, and (d) the relationship
between the insurer and the insured is quasi-fiduciary."o
In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court cautioned that extension of
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
107. In Egan, the California Supreme Court described the "special relationship" that exists
between the insurer and the insured. The court noted that insurers' obligations are quasi-
public in nature and that "the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced; the
adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior bargaining position."
Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
109. See supra notes 91 & 100 for cases discussing insurance and employment contracts.
110. Burke, Thomas & Warren, Emerging Theories of Bank Liability, in PRACTISING LAW
FIDUCIARY CONTROVERSY
such duties and ensuing tort damages into the commercial contract realm
would lead "into largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters."111
Additionally, the Seaman's court was concerned that interIjecting tort
remedies into the commercial context would seriously "intrude upon the
expectations of the parties." '12
The court in Commercial Cotton, unfortunately, was not so con-
cerned or cautious. It simply drew a broad analogy between the banking
and insurance industries, holding that they have much in common. The
court made a conclusionary statement that tort liability is proper since
the relationship between banks and their depositors constitutes a "special
relationship" characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion and
fiduciary responsibility. It appears that Commercial Cotton was a result-
oriented decision in which the court merely fashioned a decision to meet
its desired goal, employing unrelated precedent to support its holding.
Insurance contracts and deposit contracts are clearly different. In
Egan, the California Supreme Court held that in the insurer-insured rela-
tionship, "[i]nsurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries." 1 3 The insurer
enters the relationship with the insured understanding its role as the in-
sured's fiduciary. Because of this special understanding, the supteme
court held:
"[W]hen the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds
INSTITUTE, BANKS AND THEIR BORROWERS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCIAL SERV-
IcEs 473 (1984).
111. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
112. Id. Because the parties to a contract are "of roughly equal bargaining power [and] are
free to shape the contours of their agreement," the supreme court stated that "it is wise to
proceed with caution in determining [the] scope and application" of tort remedies in a com-
mercial context. Id.
Lower courts have also expressed this concern over extending tort remedies into contrac-
tual disputes. For example, in Quigley v. Pet Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1984), the owner of a trucking company brought an action against a corporation seeking to
recover damages for breach of contract and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The court held that the plaintiff must show some "special relationship"
to become an exception to the rule restricting relief to contractual damages. The Quigley court
strictly construed the Seaman's language and refused to apply tort remedies. The court
warned that a broad interpretation of Seaman's might deter both the undertaking of contrac-
tual obligations and the defense of one's rights in a contract suit. Id. at 889-94, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 401-04. In a similar manner, the court in Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 516 (1980), noted that the standard of good faith conduct implied in a commercial con-
tract differs from that implied in contracts for insurance. In the court's view, the scope of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing was to be determined by the nature of the underlying
agreement. The court held that the defendant bank's duties under the commercial loan con-
tract did not include protecting the success of the plaintiffs' investment or disregarding its own
interests; the plaintiffs were capable of and obligated to protect their own commercial interests.
Id. at 33-35, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
113. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in
tort." For the insurer to fulfill its obligation not to impair the
right of the insured to receive the benefits of the agreement, it
again must give at least as much consideration to the latter's
interests as it does to its own.1
4
The California Supreme Court has never applied such strict duties
to banks in relation to their depositors. In the bank-depositor relation-
ship, banks do not undertake or assume such obligations. Rather, banks
have relied on the established maxim that the general deposit relation-
ship is one of debtor-creditor, based on contract principles."l 5
b. affected with public interest?
One factor emphasized by the Commercial Cotton court was that
banks are affected with a "public interest." The court noted that bank-
ing is a highly regulated industry-"performing vital public services sub-
stantially affecting the public welfare."' 6 However, simply being
"affected with the public interest" is not sufficient to single out a particu-
lar industry for special treatment or imposition of fiduciary duties. 
1 1 7
In a 1953 contract case, the California Supreme Court stated,
"[t]here is no magic in the phrase 'clothed with or affected with a public
interest.' Any business is affected by a public interest when it reaches
such proportions that the interest of the public demands that it be rea-
sonably regulated."" 8 In fact, nearly every aspect of daily commerce is
affected somehow with the public welfare. The concept of "affected with
the public interest" can be applied to common carriers, theaters, restau-
rants, inns/motels, food retailers, garbage collectors, doctors and land-
lords.'1' The list is virtually endless.' 2 ' Therefore, it would be absurd to
114. Id. at 818-19, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973) (citations omit-
ted)); see also Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1109, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 717 (1974) (the insurer "is obligated to give the interests of the insured at least
as much consideration as it gives to its own interests.").
115. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
116. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
117. See State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29
(1953).
118. Id. at 455, 254 P.2d at 34 (quoting Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning &
Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938)).
119. See F. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
(1940).
120. For California cases construing the phrase "affected with a public interest," see Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1979) (public utilities); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465 (1976) (rental housing); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227
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single out banks as having a "special relationship" with its customers
merely because banking is "affected with the public interest."
The court in Commercial Cotton concluded that depositors depend
on banks to be honest and protect the deposited funds. However, banks,
like most other businesses dealing with the public, are required to carry
insurance to protect the "public welfare." The public interest is ade-
quately taken into account by the banking industry. For instance, banks
insure their depositors' funds through the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)12' or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC). 22 These entities provide coverage similar to liability
insurance for manufacturers of public goods-designed to protect the
"public interest." '123
Banking regulation, however, does not end with FDIC. There are
extensive state and federal banking regulations. For instance, Title 12 of
the United States Code contains laws related to banks and banking.
124
These laws were enacted to preserve the essential economic well-being of
the United States, and to place constraints on the bank-depositor rela-
tionship. Two commentators have concluded:
P.2d 449 (1951) (race tracks); Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586,
165 P.2d 903 (1946) (labor unions); Webb v. West Side Dist. Hosp., 144 Cal. App. 3d 946, 193
Cal. Rptr. 80 (1983) (health care).
121. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established as part of the
Banking Act of 1933. It was created to insure deposit accounts for banks that were members
of the Federal Reserve. All national banks and all members of the Federal Reserve are re-
quired to carry FDIC insurance pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1982).
122. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was established under
the National Housing Act of 1934. The FSLIC is a subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System and its policies are determined by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The
FSLIC provides savings and loan associations and similar institutions with insurance protec-
tion for their depositors comparable to that provided by the FDIC to its insured banks. See L.
RITrER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 116
(4th ed. 1983).
123. Congress established the deposit insurance system to help restore confidence in the
banking industry. The FDIC claims to owe an obligation to the entire banking community.
The former chairman of the Board of Directors of the FDIC has stated, "[t]he [FDIC]... is
concerned less with keeping the insurance fund intact and more with preserving public confi-
dence in banks." Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions
and Philosophy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 702 (1966). One commentator has stated
that "[t]he Federal Deposit Insurance System was established with a focus on depositors rather
than financial institutions." Brooks, The Federal Deposit Insurance System: The Past and the
Potential for the Future in ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW 112 (1986). The system was
designed with two "public policy" concerns in mind. First, on a small scale (micro-orienta-
tion) the system protects the individual depositor. Id. at 111. On the larger scale (macro-
orientation) the system is designed to "protect communities, states, and the country against
bank failures." Id. at 112. To safeguard these concerns, the insured banks are required to
subscribe to extensive FDIC regulations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832.
124. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-3912 (1982).
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The objectives of bank supervision, regulation, and insur-
ance are to protect the safety of depositors' funds and promote
a viable and smoothly functioning banking system-one that
will encourage saving, channel funds from savers to borrowers,
enable borrowers to get funds on reasonable terms, and foster
economic stability and growth. All of this means that the
objectives of bank supervision, regulation, and insurance are to
make sure that banks are both safe and competitive.12
The established banking regulations already adequately protect the
"public welfare." These protections, coupled with the existing common
law contract and tort remedies, make it unnecessary to further impose
fiduciary obligations upon the banking industry because of any "public
interest" concern.
c. is the deposit contract adhesive?
The Commercial Cotton court further supported its holding that
banks are under a "quasi-fiduciary" duty to its depositors by suggesting
that the bank-depositor contract, like an insurance contract, is adhesive
in nature. However, the contractual relationship between a bank and its
depositors is similar to the relationship between many other businesses
and their customers.
In Commercial Cotton, the court concluded that bank-depositor
contracts are adhesive because of the gross disparity in bargaining power
between banks and their depositors.26 However, this disparity exists in
any consumer-seller or commercial relationship. Many plaintiffs will ar-
gue that the imposition of fiduciary obligations is appropriate whenever
one party has a stronger bargaining position or greater knowledge and
has the ability to reach out and exploit the weaker party. However, the
California Supreme Court has never held that the ability to exploit a
disparity of bargaining power is a useful test for imposing a fiduciary
duty;127 "[i]f it were, the law of fiduciary relations would largely displace
both the tort of fraud and much of the Commercial Code."12 Thus, the
Commercial Cotton court's determination that banks are fiduciaries be-
cause the bank-depositor contract is adhesive, has no support.
The presence of competition is, in itself, a rebuttal to most disparity
of bargaining power arguments. The Commercial Cotton court did not
125. L. R=ITER & W. SILBER, supra note 122, at 109.
126. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
127. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 221
n.21, 673 P.2d 660, 675 n.21, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 798 n.21 (1983).
128. Id at 221, 673 P.2d at 675, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
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seem to consider that banking is a competitive enterprise where custom-
ers have a freedom of choice. The public enjoys the protections of the
free market, and banks market and administer their services to maintain
good public relations in this competitive industry.
In addition to competition, the depositor is protected from possible
overreaching tactics through the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 12 9
The UCC defines, discusses, and governs the relationship between banks
and their depositors. Banks have no ability to decrease their potential
liability or exclude certain duties imposed by the UCC. For example, the
UCC establishes when a bank may charge a customer's account;130 de-
fines a bank's liability to the depositor for the wrongful dishonor of an
item;131 describes a customer's right to stop payment;1 32 and even holds
the customer to a duty to discover and report unauthorized signatures or
alterations. 133
The UCC therefore further defines the bank-depositor relationship
and provides regulations to discourage adhesive contracts. The bank-
depositor relationship has always been described as being contractual
and as establishing a debtor-creditor relationship. 13  Although a bank
could incur tort liability through wrongful conduct, there is no authority
to support the proposition that mere gross disparity of bargaining power,
or unreasonable adhesiveness can be used to justify the judicially im-
posed fiduciary obligations that Commercial Cotton suggests are present
in the bank-depositor relationship.
3. The "quasi-fiduciary" holding in Commercial Cotton was
unnecessary and should be limited
The decision in Commercial Cotton might have been appropriate if
the court had relied solely on the "special relationship" rationale of the
129. U.C.C. §§ 4-101-4-504.
130. Id. § 4-401; CAL. COM. CODE § 4401 (West 1964); see, eg., Pacific Coast Cheese, Inc.
v. Security First Natl Bank, 45 Cal. 2d 75, 286 P.2d 353 (1955); Bank of Am. v. Universal
Fin. Co., 131 Cal. App. 116, 21 P.2d 147 (1933).
131. U.C.C. § 4-402; CAL. COM. CODE § 4402; see, e.g., Weaver v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963); Allen v. Bank of Am. Natl
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943).
132. U.C.C. § 4-403; CAL. COM. CODE § 4403; see, e.g., Wright v. Bank of Am., 176 Cal.
App. 2d 176, 1 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1959).
133. U.C.C. § 4-406; CAL. COM. CODE § 4406; see, eg., Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers & Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 P. 424 (1923).
134. See Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part 1-The Relevance of Contract Doc-
trine, 100 BANKING L.J. 220 (1983).
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California Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's.13 Commercial Cotton
overstepped Seaman's by introducing fiduciary principles to support its
decision. There was no reason for the court to hold that "[t]he relation-
ship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary."'136 In fact, it quite
simply could have been a "slip of the judicial tongue." Arguably, the
court was attempting to follow the holding in Egan, that "[the obliga-
tions of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and
humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary."' 37 The court in
Commercial Cotton introduced the term "quasi-fiduciary" simply to sup-
port its finding that the bank breached its implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing when it claimed spurious defenses to avoid liability.
Soon after Seaman's, the same appellate court which decided Com-
mercial Cotton concluded that a tort claim for bad faith breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would lie for breach of a
noninsurance contract if characteristics similar to those of insurance con-
tracts were present.'38 The court held that the following "similar charac-
teristics" must be present to make a noninsurance contract similar
enough to an insurance contract so that the "special relationship" doc-
trine would apply:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently
unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering
the contract must be a nonprofit motivation, i.e., to secure
peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract
damages are not adequate, because (a) they do not require the
party in the superior position to account for its actions, and
(b) they do not make the inferior party "whole"; (4) one party
is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may suf-
fer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform;
and (5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability. 13 9
Based on the foregoing test for noninsurance contracts, it is possible
that the Commercial Cotton court may have had adequate grounds for
135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (emphasis added).
137. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487. See supra text accom-
panying note 102 for discussion of Egan.
138. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984).
Wallis involved an action by a laid off furniture employee against his former employer for
terminating monthly payments agreed to in return for plaintiff's non-competition with the
employer's business. The court spelled out the factors which must be present to permit a
finding of tort liability in a breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing case.
The court suggests that these characteristics are present in most employer-employee relation-
ships. Id. at 1118-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
139. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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establishing that the bank tortiously breached its implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing based upon the existence of a special relation-
ship. However, the court could have done so without characterizing the
relationship as fiduciary or even quasi-fiduciary. By introducing the term
"quasi-fiduciary," the court was apparently unaware of the ramifications
that imposing this label on banks could create. This decision (or "judi-
cial slip") has "muddied the waters" considerably for future decisions to
the detriment of the entire banking industry.
B. Barrett v. Bank of America-The Bank-Borrower Relationship
In a more recent case, the same California appellate court that de-
cided Commercial Cotton v. United California Bank1" followed its own
precedent and dramatically extended the reach of fiduciary principles to
the bank-borrower relationship. In Barrett v. Bank of America"' the
court held that a traditional bank-borrower relationship, in addition to a
bank-depositor relationship, can give rise to fiduciary obligations. 142
1. The facts
In Barrett, the plaintiffs (Barretts) were principal shareholders in a
small electronics corporation. The Barretts obtained a $253,000 Small
Business Administration (SBA) loan and a $400,000 line of credit from
Bank of America. To secure these loans, the Barretts executed two per-
sonal guarantees to the bank: one in the amount of $655,000 and one on
an SBA form in the amount of $253,000 secured by trust deeds on two
houses. Less than a month later, the bank informed the Barretts that
they were in "technical default" because their assets to liability ratio no
longer conformed to the bank's requirements. Mr. Chaffee, the bank's
loan officer, suggested that in order to cure the default the Barretts
should bring in new investors by way of a merger or acquisition.
143
Chaffee advised Barrett that "a company that merged with [Barrett's cor-
poration] would be responsible for the loans and the Bank would release
the Barretts' personal guarantees." 144
The Barretts began merger negotiations with Coded Communica-
tions (Coded), but Barrett rejected the proposals because they did not
include a release of the personal guarantees. Coded finally agreed to the
release six months after the closing date of the merger. Coded filed for
140. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
141. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986).
142. Id. at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
143. Id. at 1365, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
144. Id., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
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bankruptcy when it could no longer make payments on the Barretts'
SBA loan. The bank assigned its collateral to the SBA including the
Barretts' note, personal guarantee and the trust deed securing that
guarantee.
The Barretts were forced to sell their home and turn over the pro-
ceeds to the SBA. As a result, the Barretts instituted an action against
Bank of America alleging breach of contract, fraud, conspiracy to de-
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. 145 The
action focused on the bank's failure to honor its alleged promise to re-
lease the Barretts' personal guarantees upon the merger of their corpora-
tion with Coded.
The jury found that the Barretts reasonably believed that they
would be released from the personal guarantees, and that Chaffee ex-
pressly promised they would be released after consummation of the
merger.1 46 However, the jury also found in a special verdict that Chaffee
did not make the assertion "in a manner not warranted by the informa-
tion known to him."147 As a result, the trial court interpreted the special
verdict "as a definitive factual finding against the [Barretts] on any fraud
theory because of the absence of scienter." 148 The trial court rejected the
Barretts' request for instructions on constructive fraud.
149
The appellate court reversed. Notwithstanding the factual findings
of the jury, the appellate court held that there was substantial evidence to
support a constructive fraud theory." The court first noted that
"[c]onstructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a rela-
tion of trust and confidence exists."1'' The court further stated that
"[c]onfidential and fiduciary relations are in law, synonymous and may
be said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in
another."' 52 In order to link a constructive fraud theory based upon fi-
duciary principles to the bank-borrower relationship, the Barrett court
restated its own recent holding in Commercial Cotton that "[t]he rela-
145. Id. at 1365-67, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
146. Id., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
147. Id.; see id. at 1367 n.2, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19 n.2 for a discussion of the special verdict.
148. Id. at 1367, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
149. Id. at 1368, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The Barretts challenged the trial court verdict in
favor of the bank upon the basis that the trial court should have instructed the jury on a theory
of "constructive fraud." Id. at 1367-68, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. See infra text accompanying
notes 159-67 for a discussion of constructive fraud.
150. Barrett, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
151. Id. at 1368, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
152. Id. (citing Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583, 588 (1922)).
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tionship of a bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary." 153 The Barrett
court noted that other jurisdictions recognize a similar relationship of
trust and confidence between a bank and its loan customers." 4 There-
fore, the court concluded that there was sufficiently substantial evidence
in this case implicating a confidential and fiduciary relationship between
the bank and plaintiffs to support a constructive fraud theory. 5 To
establish such a fiduciary relationship, the court cited the following facts:
that the Barretts perceived their relationship with Chaffee as a very close
one, that Mr. Barrett relied upon Chaffee's financial and merger advice
and that he shared confidential financial information with the bank.
1 56
2. Critique of Barrett
The court in Barrett both affirmed and expanded upon the decision
in Commercial Cotton. It determined that the relationship of a bank to
its depositors and loan customers is based on trust and confidence, creat-
ing at least a "quasi-fiduciary" relationship.157 This relationship gives
rise to a duty of full disclosure of facts which may place a bank or a third
party at an advantage with respect to the customer.15 8 The Barrett court,
however, misapplied both the concept of "constructive fraud" and the
case law regarding the bank-borrower relationship.
a. constructive fraud
The court in Barrett applied the tort of constructive fraud to find
liability on the part of Bank of America. The California Civil Code
states that:
Constructive fraud consists:
1. In any breach of duty which, without an actually
fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or
any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prej-
udice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; or,
2. In any such act or omission as the law specially de-
clares to be fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud. 9
153. Barrett, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (citing Commercial Cotton Co.
v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985)).
154. Id. (citing Stewart v. Phoenix Natl Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); First Nat'l
Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); and Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn.
418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1370, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
158. Id.
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1573 (West 1982).
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The court employed circular reasoning to establish a constructive
fraud theory. To apply constructive fraud, the court had to first find
that a relation of trust and confidence existed.'" The court held that
"[c]onfidential and fiduciary relations are in law, synonymous and may
be said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in
another.' 16 1 The court then reasoned that if a fiduciary relationship ex-
ists in the bank-depositor context, as it decided in Commercial Cotton, it
should also exist in the bank-borrower relationship. 162 Completing the
syllogism, the court determined that since the Barrett-Bank of America
relationship is a fiduciary one, a constructive fraud theory could be ap-
plied.16  This conclusion is not the result of sound reasoning.
First, the relationship between banks and their depositors is not the
same as the relationship between banks and their borrowers. The two
relationships require varying standards of care. The bank-depositor rela-
tionship should require a higher standard (though not a fiduciary stan-
dard) since the depositor has entrusted the bank (as a bailee) with his
funds. The depositor expects the bank to disburse the funds only at his
request.
In the bank-borrower relationship, the bank is relying on the bor-
rower to repay funds the bank has entrusted to its borrower. The loan
agreement is the result of an arms-length contract between the two par-
ties where both parties expect the other to be fair and honest in their
representations. There is no indication of fiduciary responsibilities on
either party. The customer searches for the best interest rate possible
and the bank expects to profit from the difference between the interest
the bank pays to depositors and the interest the bank charges on the loan.
Both parties are concerned with their own interests and are held to con-
tractual standards of care.
Second, the Barrett court failed to realize that trust and confidence
are not alone sufficient to give rise to fiduciary obligations." The Cali-
160. Darrow v. Robert A. Klein & Co., Ill Cal. App. 310, 315-16, 295 P. 566, 568 (1931);
see also Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 879, 124 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1975) (breach
of duty necessary to demonstrate constructive fraud must be one created by a confidential
relationship); Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1966) (construc-
tive fraud frequently consists of breach of duty arising out of confidential or fiduciary
relationship).
161. Barrett, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See 1 B. WrrKIN, supra note 21, § 320; see also Wilson v. Zorb, 15 Cal. App. 2d 526,
532, 59 P.2d 593, 596 (1936) ("It takes something more than friendship or confidence in the
professional skill and in the integrity and truthfulness of another to establish a fiduciary
relationship.").
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fornia Supreme Court established that it is also necessary to show that
the party in whom trust and confidence are reposed "'purports to act or
advise with the other's interest in mind.' "165 To sustain liability on the
theory of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, the record must show
that the party at fault knowingly undertook to act or advise in the other's
best interests.'66 Similarly, a bank's duty to its customers should be lim-
ited to those transactions in which the bank knowingly undertook to act
or advise with the borrower's best interests in mind. In Barrett, Bank of
America was simply trying to protect its financial interest in the loans to
the Barretts. The California Supreme Court has held that "in the ab-
sence of an acceptance of trust, which is the essence of a confidential
relationship, a violation of confidence does not create a cause of action in
constructive fraud."' 67 Since Bank of America did not purport to act or
advise with the Barretts' best interests in mind, the court had no basis for
establishing that the bank was a fiduciary, and therefore had no grounds
for finding liability based on constructive fraud.
b. misapplication of case law
To support its proposition that a relationship of trust and confidence
exists between a bank and its loan customers, the Barrett court cited
three supreme court cases from other states. 168 First, the court cited
Klein v. First Edina National Bank,169 a Minnesota case, which set forth
a test for determining if a bank has a fiduciary duty to disclose certain
facts of a loan transaction. The test required that "special circumstances
exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason to know that the cus-
tomer is placing his trust and confidence in the bank and is relying on the
bank so to counsel and inform him."' 170 Thus, for a plaintiff to establish a
fiduciary claim, the court must find (1) a justifiable reposing of trust and
165. Estate of Sanders, 40 Cal. 3d 607, 615, 710 P.2d 232, 237, 221 Cal. Rptr. 432, 437
(1985) (quoting Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744,750, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1972)).
166. Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 221, 673
P.2d 660, 675-76, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 798 (1983). See supra note 18 and accompanying text for
discussion of Children's Television.
167. Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 510, 535 P.2d 1161, 1167, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711 (1975)
(citing Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1961); Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank v. Kuchman, 224 Cal. App. 2d 490, 36 Cal. Rptr.
806 (1964)).
168. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v.
Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196
N.W.2d 619 (1972).
169. 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 for a dis-
cussion of Klein.
170. Klein, 293 Minn. at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 623.
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confidence on the part of the plaintiff, and (2) acceptance or knowledge
(or notice) of such reliance by the bank.
The second case the Barrett court cited, First National Bank v.
Brown,171 did not address either of these requirements. In this Iowa
Supreme Court decision, the court reasoned that bank-borrower loan
agreements were not arms-length transactions, rather "there exists a rela-
tionship of trust or confidence" and the bank "has superior knowledge of
the facts." 172 It is important to note that the court in Brown did not use
the term "fiduciary." The entire case was based on fraud and not breach
of fiduciary duties. The court held that the bank "breached a duty to
defendants which amounted in equity to fraud in the inducement, giving
rise to a right of avoidance on the part of [the Browns].' 1 73 The Brown
court treated the case as a contractual dispute and looked to the princi-
ples of equitable remedies, rather than tort, to satisfy the aggrieved party.
Brown can be distinguished from Barrett because the Barrett decision was
not based on fraud, nor did the court fashion an equitable or contractual
remedy. The Barrett court determined that tort remedies were proper
based on a breach of fiduciary duties. The court in Barrett relied on
Brown for support, yet employed different reasoning.
Finally, the Barrett court cited Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank 
74
which stated that "the relation between plaintiff [customer] and defend-
ant [bank] was far beyond that of mere debtor and creditor."'175 How-
ever, the court did not state how far beyond debtor and creditor the
relationship was. As in Brown, the Stewart court never mentioned "fidu-
ciary" in its decision. Stewart was decided in 1937 when courts were
attempting to weaken the doctrine of caveat emptor ("let the buyer be-
ware") and give more power to the consumer. 7 6 Stewart represents the
beginning of the courts' attempt to change the attitudes of consumers
toward commercial enterprises. The Stewart court simply raised the
standard of care for banks in relation to their customers. Both Stewart
and Brown can be explained under traditional fraud theories. The cases
involved misrepresentation and failure to disclose material facts. These
171. 181 N.W.2d 178. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57 for a discussion of Brown.
172. Brown, 181 N.W.2d at 182.
173. Id. at 184.
174. 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62 for discussion of
Stewart.
175. Stewart, 49 Ariz. at 44, 64 P.2d at 106.
176. Id. Because a bank is subject to the rules applying to confidential relations in general,
it does not mean that banks cannot make a reasonable profit. "[B]ut it does mean that it
cannot appeal to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and that it must disclose fairly and honestly to
the client all of the facts which might be presumed to influence him in regard to his actions."
Id. at 46, 64 P.2d at 106.
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opinions should not be interpreted as a foundation for establishing that
banks are fiduciaries to their borrowers.
The court in Barrett should have compared its facts to those in
Stenberg v. Northwestern National Bank.1 7' The Stenbergs, like the Bar-
retts, were a married couple involved in a small business. The defendant
bank made false representations to the Stenbergs regarding their loans.
Nevertheless, the court in Stenberg rejected plaintiffs' claim that a fiduci-
ary relationship existed.178 The court determined that Mr. Stenberg, a
businessman, was "capable of independent judgment." 179 The court
found that the Stenbergs did not justifiably rely on the bank's representa-
tions-they could have made their own judgments. Under the Stenberg
analysis, the Barretts would have likewise been recognized as experienced
business people, "capable of independent judgment." 180
In Denison State Bank v. Madeira 8 the Kansas Supreme Court fur-
ther supported the Stenberg rationale by holding that "[o]ne may not
abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and unilat-
erally impose a fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious as-
sumption of such duties by the one sought to be held liable as a
fiduciary." '182 The plaintiff in Madeira was also held to be fully compe-
tent and able to protect his own interest. 183
The rationale adopted in Klein, Stenberg and Madeira is more per-
suasive reasoning than the cases cited by Barrett. First, these cases re-
quire that the customer place a "justifiable or reasonable" trust and
confidence in the bank. Second, the cases require that the bank accept,
know or have reason to know that the plaintiff was placing its trust and
177. 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 71-73 for
discussion of Stenberg.
178. Stenberg, 307 Minn. at 488, 238 N.W.2d at 219.
179. Id.
180. For further support of this rationale, see MacKenzie v. Summit Nat'l Bank, 363
N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In MacKenzie, the plaintiff, a corporate officer, guaran-
teed a bank loan to the corporation with a mortgage on his homestead. When the corporation
failed to repay the loan, the bank initiated foreclosure proceedings on the plaintiff's home.
Plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the bank. The trial court found that the bank
owed the plaintiff a duty to disclose the corporation's poor financial condition at the time of
the loan. Following the Klein rule, the appellate court reversed, holding that the bank had no
reason to believe that the plaintiff was relying on the bank to advise and counsel him. Id. at
119. Accordingly, the court held that the bank had no fiduciary obligation to disclose to the
plaintiff the financial condition of the corporation. Id. The plaintiff also failed to prove the
first part of the test, that the plaintiff reasonably placed his trust and confidence in the bank or
that he had relied upon the bank to counsel and inform him. Id.
181. 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 74-81 for a
discussion of Denison.
182. Denison, 230 Kan. at 696, 640 P.2d at 1243-44.
183. Id.
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confidence in the bank. The Barrett court recognized the existence of the
first Klein requirement, but seemingly disregarded the second. The court
held there was substantial evidence of a confidential relationship based
on the "Barretts' perception" of their relationship with the bank. 184 The
court, however, failed to justify the Barretts' reliance. Additionally, the
court never addressed the bank's acceptance or awareness of this confi-
dential relationship. Before being held liable for breach of a fiduciary
duty, the bank should be entitled to know, or at least have reason to
know that they have entered into a relationship which requires such a
duty.
The Barrett court should have examined cases like Klein, Stenberg
and Madeira and the concept of "fiduciary" more carefully. The Bar-
retts should not have abandoned all caution and responsibility for their
own protection and unilaterally imposed a fiduciary relationship upon
Bank of America without a conscious assumption of such duties by the
bank. Bank of America was clearly acting out of self-interest, but at no
time did it exercise undue influence over the Barretts. The Barretts were
capable of protecting their own interests even if it required investigation
of representations made by the bank's officer.
c. justifiable reposing of trust and confidence?
The facts in Barrett are not uncommon or unusual for bank-bor-
rower relationships, especially where the relationship is long-standing.
The borrower relied upon and trusted the bank and its representatives.
Virtually every bank-borrower relationship would give rise to a fiduciary
duty if all the plaintiff has to prove is that a relationship of trust and
confidence existed. The Barrett court went too far in protecting the
plaintiffs. The court failed to carefully consider whether the Barretts had
justifiably reposed trust and confidence in the bank and whether the bank
accepted such trust and confidence. Purely subjective reliance or trust
alone is insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship. 8 Mere "friend-
ship or confidence in the professional skill and in the integrity and truth-
fulness of another" is not sufficient to raise an exception to the ordinary
expectation that each party to a commercial transaction will look after
his own interests.18 6 There should be no duty on either party to act for
184. Barrett, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1370, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
185. Fowler v. Associated Oil Co., 74 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1937) (one's implicit faith in another's
honesty and integrity is insufficient to establish fiduciary relationships and sustain presumption
of constructive fraud).
186. Wilson v. Zorb, 15 Cal. App. 2d 526, 532, 59 P.2d 593, 596 (1936); see also Kudokas v.
Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972); Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247
(Tex. 1962).
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the benefit or protection of the other party nor to disclose facts that the
other party could by its own due diligence have discovered.18 7 In
Barrett, the plaintiffs could have and should have further investigated the
representation that they would be released from their guarantees. This
representation was made by one loan officer who believed he was telling
the truth. The Barretts could have easily asked for verification and au-
thorization of this representation in writing by a higher bank official or
could have consulted an attorney. The representation for release of the
guarantees was significant enough to warrant diligent investigation rather
than blind faith in a loan officer.
In California, courts have held that where a party "fails to pursue
those facts of which he has notice, he is nevertheless held to have knowl-
edge of each and every fact that he would have discovered had he pur-
sued the facts he did have knowledge of." '88 The Barretts had know-
ledge of the promised release. Accordingly, they should have pursued
and investigated that fact to determine if they would actually be released
of all personal guarantees upon completion of the merger. "[O]nce the
plaintiff becomes aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent
person suspicious, the duty to investigate arises and the plaintiff may
then be charged with the knowledge of facts which would have been dis-
covered by such an investigation."' 89 The represented fact that the Bar-
retts would be released of their personal guarantees was a significant
factor of the merger agreement. Surely a reasonably prudent person
would have asked for written verification of the release. Instead, the Bar-
retts unjustifiably relied on a loan officer's oral representation.' 90
The Barrett court, by characterizing the Barretts' relationship with
the bank as a fiduciary one and saddling the bank with all of the corre-
sponding fiduciary duties, went too far in protecting the plaintiffs.
"[T]he policy of the law is that he who will not reasonably guard his own
interest when he has reasonable opportunity to do so, and there is no
circumstance reasonably calculated to deter him from improving such
187. See Metcalf v. Leedy, Wheeler & Co., 140 Fla. 149, 191 So. 690 (1939); Glass v. Craig,
83 Fla. 408, 91 So. 332 (1922).
188. Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 131 n.12, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 69 n.12
(1975). Accord Miller v. Bechtel Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 868, 875, 663 P.2d 177, 181, 191 Cal. Rptr.
619, 623 (1983).
189. Bedolla, 52 Cal. App. 3d at 131, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (citing Hobart v. Hobart Estate
Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 440-42, 159 P.2d 958, 974 (1945)); see also Lazzarone v. Bank of Am., 181
Cal. App. 3d 581, 226 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1986).
190. It seems the Barrett court could have found Bank of America liable under "breach of
contract" principles based on the bank's failure to perform its promise (oral representation) to
release Barretts' personal guarantees.
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opportunity, must take the consequences."' 191 The Barrett court went be-
yond the reasonable limits of protecting improvident plaintiffs. 192
C. Policy Implications of Commercial Cotton and Barrett
In addition to poor reasoning and scanty case support, there are
several policy issues that were not addressed by the courts in Commercial
Cotton Co. v. United California Bank 93 and Barrett v. Bank of
America. 1
94
1. Conflict of interest
It is accepted in California that:
A fiduciary... assumes duties beyond those of mere fairness
and honesty... he must undertake to act on behalf of the bene-
ficiary. A fiduciary's power to transact business with his benefi-
191. George E. Sebring Co. v. Skinner, 100 Fla. 315, 322-23, 129 So. 759, 761 (1930).
192. The Barrett rationale has already had some impact on lower courts. In a recent trial
court decision from the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, the trial judge
found a bank liable to its customer on theories of good faith and fair dealing and breach of
fiduciary duty. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Williams, Nos. 457727/457728 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 7, 1986). Williams, a San Diego automobile dealer, was a long-time customer of Security
Pacific. Security Pacific provided Williams with special privileges for financing the dealership.
Williams allegedly placed a great deal of trust in the bank and relied upon the bank's repre-
sentatives to assist him with the financial management of his dealership.
In 1979, Security Pacific was looking for a new owner to take over a Los Angeles dealer-
ship where a Security Pacific loan was in jeopardy. Ross, a bank representative, indicated to
Williams that he ought to purchase the dealership and made several representations to Wil-
liams about the dealership's finances. Williams purchased the Los Angeles dealership in May
1979. The gasoline crisis soon struck California. Williams was forced to release the dealership
back to Chrysler's financing company by February 1980 and incurred a substantial loss from a
deficiency judgment.
Because of the gasoline crisis, the entire auto industry was deteriorating. Williams moved
back to his San Diego dealership which was also struggling, Security Pacific instituted restric-
tive financing practices to protect its security interests, forcing Williams to file for bankruptcy.
Following liquidation, Security Pacific brought suit against Williams for its deficiency. Wil-
liams cross-complained on several counts, including breach of fiduciary relationship.
The trial judge held that:
[t]he Williams-Security Pacific National Bank [relationship] went far beyond a
lender-borrower relationship. It was an all-encompassing, mutually beneficial, day-
to-day relationship in which both sides reposed trust and confidence in one an-
other .... The relationship here, had much the makings of a mutually beneficial
partnership. Williams did in fact repose trust and confidence in the integrity and
fidelity and financial judgments of these bank officers and the bank officials knew it.
Id. at 36-37.
The court awarded Williams nearly $2 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in
punitive damages. The Williams case has been appealed.
193. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1985).
194. Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986).
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ciary is severely limited; he must use the utmost good faith and,
if he profits from the transaction, the law presumes the agree-
ment was entered into by the beneficiary "without sufficient
consideration and under undue influence."
195
Accepting this definition of "fiduciary," if Commercial Cotton and
Barrett are correctly decided, banks today are faced with a serious con-
flict of interest because they are now forced to give priority to the inter-
ests of their depositors and borrowers. For example, as a matter of law, a
bank/creditor normally has an unqualified right to call a loan and en-
force collection.19 6 However, when labeled as a fiduciary, it is questiona-
ble whether the bank can properly exercise this right. Banks need to
protect their investment and security interests; however, if they attempt
to do so they would not be looking out for the best interests of their
customers.
Several courts have lost sight of the role banks play in commercial
lending and deposit taking. Banks, like other commercial enterprises,
engage in commercial activity for the purpose of making money. A
bank's primary concern is its own financial interest, not that of its cus-
tomer. The old maxim which states, "one cannot serve two masters,"
should be adopted in the banking industry as well as other commercial
arenas. Banks cannot protect their own best interests while under a fidu-
ciary duty to act for the benefit of the customer, giving priority to the
customer's best interest. It is assumed that if a fiduciary profits from the
confidential relationship-the fiduciary is exerting his influence to obtain
an advantage at the expense of the confiding party.197 Based on this ra-
tionale, it would seem impractical, and nearly impossible for an ordinary
business or contractual relationship to carry with it fiduciary obligations.
Accordingly, such an obligation should not be imposed on banks in
the ordinary bank-borrower or bank-depositor relationship except in rare
cases. The courts in Commercial Cotton and Barrett failed to consider
that extending fiduciary duties into the bank-customer relationship will
195. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 222,
673 P.2d 660, 676, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 799 (1983) (citation omitted) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2235 (West 1985)); see also supra note 13; Smith v. Zak, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 98 Cal. Rptr.
242 (1971); Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal. App. 2d 263, 9 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 170 (1959).
196. In re Teltronics Serv., 29 Bankr. 139, 170 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Centerre
Bank, N.A. v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (a demand note may be
called for payment at any time, rejecting a "good faith" requirement). Accord Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980); Allied Sheet
Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 967 (1974).
197. Ogilvie, supra note 26, at 287.
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drastically "intrude upon the expectations of the parties."' 198 The effect
of the decisions could be to take the bank-customer relationship out of
the "commercial realm." If regarded as a fiduciary to its customers, a
bank will be forced to put its interests behind those of the customer,
thereby preventing the bank from forming desirable contracts with its
customers, and fulfilling its duty to bank shareholders and creditors.
There is ample authority holding that the general bank-borrower
relationship is based upon contract and not fiduciary principles. 199 It
would be unfair to conclude that the bank should be placed in a fiduciary
position simply because its customers allege there is a confidential or
trusting relationship between themselves and the bank, that the custom-
ers relied upon the bank, or that banking is a "public service enterprise"
affected with a public interest. Surely no more trust is reposed on the
bank in a lending relationship than in numerous other contractual rela-
tionships-especially on the commercial level. For example, consider the
following hypothetical:
Assume ABC, a prominent business machines corpora-
tion, had an ongoing relationship (about 15 years) with Ms.
Wizard, owner of the small but successful Wizard Widget Cor-
poration. Ms. Wizard had put a tremendous amount of trust in
the expertise of her ABC representative, Mr. Circuit, to keep
her company running smoothly with the use of up-to-date com-
puter technology. Recently Ms. Wizard called on Mr. Circuit
to determine the "best" system for her growing business, and
advise her on how to finance the purchase of the system. Wiz-
ard explained in detail the company's business plans, sharing
with Circuit confidential marketing and financial information.
Circuit, realizing that Wizard would trust his judgment, recom-
mended a system that was clearly inadequate for the growing
needs of the Wizard Corporation. As it turns out, ABC simply
wanted to unload one of last-year's systems to clear out its in-
ventory. Wizard incurred substantial losses because the system
could not keep up with her competitor's "state-of-the-art" com-
puter system.
Does ABC owe a "fiduciary" duty to Ms. Wizard? Wizard clearly
198. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d
1158, 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 0984); see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
199. See, eg., In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 699 F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1983); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 1026
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Manson State Bank v. Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1976); Denison State
Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982).
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put all her trust and confidence in ABC, shared confidential and financial
information with it, and ABC knew Wizard was relying on it. ABC in-
tentionally and purposefully protected its own best interest by selling the
"old" model. However, the answer to the question is clearly no. Wizard
is adequately protected by contractual and even tort remedies for fraud.
California courts have not extended fiduciary principles into this com-
mercial realm. But, how would the court differentiate the ABC-Wizard
relationship from the bank-borrower relationship? Arguably, both situa-
tions deal with apparent "unequal" bargaining positions, superior knowl-
edge of the transaction by one party, a repose of trust and confidence by
one party in the inferior position, and knowledge of that trust by the
superior party. Is this enough to establish that the party in the superior
position owes fiduciary obligations to the inferior party? "To adopt such
a standard would put an intolerable obligation upon banking institutions
and convert ordinary day-to-day business transactions into fiduciary rela-
tionships where none were intended or anticipated." 2'
2. Economic/public concerns
Naturally, the economic burden of the banking institution being
held to such a high level of fiduciary responsibility will ultimately fall on
the bank customers. As a result of the decisions in Commercial Cotton
and Barrett, the entire banking industry is at a substantially greater risk.
But like other industries, banks will pass the cost of this risk on to their
customers. Banks will allocate this cost through higher interest rates for
loans and increased administration fees.
In addition, because of the threat of potential punitive or tort dam-
age awards arising out of alleged breach of fiduciary obligations, banks
may hesitate to offer advice regarding bank loans or any other matter.
There exists in banking today an overwhelming fear that a judge or jury
may, in hindsight, decide that the bank owed a fiduciary obligation to its
customer. As a result, customers will be less informed or perhaps unin-
formed of critical aspects of the nature of the loan agreement. In the
bank-borrower relationship, the bank officer will decline to give any type
of personal business advice for fear that the customer will claim a repos-
ing of trust and confidence in them. Though imposition of fiduciary du-
ties will benefit the few claiming such obligations, it appears that the
public interest in banking militates against, not in favor of, holding the
bank to a high level of fiduciary obligation in the bank-customer
relationship.
200. Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 695, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (1982).
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V. PROPOSALS
Judicial decisions, so far, have failed to provide banks with clear
boundaries of acceptable conduct in their relationship with depositors
and borrowers. The issues have been dealt with on a haphazard case-by-
case approach-leaving banks in the unenviable position of interpreta-
tion and implementation of the varying standards and laws.
A. Strict Statutory/Common Law Protections
There are numerous statutory and common-law doctrines designed
to protect the banking customer. For example, the depositor and bor-
rower relationships are considered contractual and "[e]very contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."20 1 Thus, courts have recently held
banks liable to their customers for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.202 Some examples of conduct constituting
bad faith include: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence
and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a
power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance. "203 This remedy sufficiently protects the
customer from any overreaching and deceptive banking practices.
Historically, the bank customer has been at a relative disadvantage
under our legal system. In recent years, however, numerous laws and
statutes have been enacted on both the state and federal level to protect
the bank customer and regulate the field of credit practices. 2 4 The most
prominent federal legislation is the Consumer Credit Protection Act.205
This Act contains provisions concerning consumer credit cost disclosure
(truth-in-lending),20 6 credit reporting,201 discrimination in credit208 and
debt collection practices.20 9 Banks that fail to comply with the various
requirements of the state and federal regulations are liable for damages
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
202. See, eg., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985) (bad faith
refusal to finance the debtor's operations); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 293
(Alaska 1983) (wrongful repossession of collateral); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d
1226 (Mont. 1984) (wrongful acceleration of a debtor's note).
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment d.
204. F. BEUTEL & M. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANK-
ING LAW (5th ed. 1982).
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
206. Id. §§ 1601-1667e.
207. Id. §§ 1681-1681t.
208. Id. §§ 1691-1691f.
209. Id. §§ 1692-1692o. The Act also contains provisions covering garnishment, id. §§ 1671-
1677, and electronic fund transfer, id. §§ 1693-1693r.
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arising from the violation, costs incurred by the aggrieved party and cer-
tain statutory penalties. In addition, "[c]laims against lenders may be
asserted under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Bankruptcy
Code, the federal securities laws, the tax and wage laws, and RICO."21 0
These federal and state regulations do not label banks as "fiducia-
ries" to their deposit and loan customers. The regulations are a good
example of legislative action directed at protecting consumers without
imposing excessive and unwarranted duties upon the bank. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has held that:
[T]he various statutory and common law doctrines fashioned to
protect the consumer from overreaching and deception are
strong and flexible enough to accomplish that purpose, and that
it is unnecessary to call upon the law of fiduciary relationships
to perform a function for which it was not designed and is
largely unsuited.21'
With all the forms of protection provided for the consumer in the bank-
ing industry, it is unnecessary to look to the law of fiduciary relationships
to govern an institution for which it was not designed and is highly un-
suited. Courts should recognize this.
B. Banks and Customers Should Define Their Relationship
To avoid confusion, the parties to a loan transaction should explic-
itly state the nature of their agreement. If the customer wishes to hold
the bank to a fiduciary standard of care, the bank should be aware of it.
If not explicit, a practical method for a bank to avoid liability for breach
of fiduciary duties is through a written agreement with the customer.
For instance, within the loan/deposit documents, banks should clearly
and explicitly state that they are not a fiduciary with respect to the cus-
tomer. In essence, banks would be forewarning customers of the bank's
position in the relationship and advising them of the bank's intention to
protect its own best interests. Since the relationship between a deposi-
tor/borrower and a bank is "contractual" in nature, the parties should be
free to establish or deny the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
themselves by agreement. The UCC prohibits disclaimer of the good
faith obligation, as well as the obligations of diligence, reasonableness
and care, but provides that "the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be mea-
210. Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw.
L.J. 775, 783-84 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
211. Children's Television, 35 Cal. 3d at 222, 673 P.2d at 676, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 799; see
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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sured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." 212 Even if
such a provision were unreasonable and unenforceable, the provision
should be considered when determining whether the customer justifiably
reposed trust and confidence in the bank and whether the bank had
knowledge of the customer's reposing of trust and confidence.
A second method by which banks may protect themselves is
through a jury waiver. Most of the cases in which borrowers have tri-
umphed have been tried before a jury. Therefore, "[blanks should con-
sider providing for a waiver of the borrower's right to a jury trial in the
loan documents if permitted by local law."' 213 Juries have tended to favor
the customer over the bank and have awarded significant damages to
plaintiffs.214 Waiver of a jury trial could be a protection for the bank
from the "wave" of enormous jury verdicts.
Similarly, banks should provide in the loan agreement that any ac-
tion brought by the customer against a bank will be governed by the
substantive law of the bank's home state.215 "This is advantageous be-
cause the bank's forms were most likely drafted to conform to the law of
the state where the bank is located and the bank's counsel is more com-
fortable with the laws of that state.
2 16
Also, deposit and loan agreements should contain an arbitration
provision. If any dispute arises between the customer and the bank, they
should settle the matter through an arbitrator. Arbitrators would be
much less likely to hold banks to a fiduciary standard than would a jury.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, banks should protect them-
selves from imposition of unexpected fiduciary obligations through
proper training of bank personnel. Banks must carefully train and advise
personnel regarding what they should and should not say when dealing
with a customer. Unfortunately, courts have been unclear as to when the
fiduciary obligation arises, so banks are forced to be over-cautious. Until
standards are established by the legislature or clarified by the courts,
banks must be cautious in what they say to prevent the customer from
"reposing trust and confidence" in them and establishing a basis for fidu-
ciary obligation.
The problem today is that "[t]he growing number of lawsuits against
lenders indicates that changes in the law are not always transmitted to
212. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1976).
213. Flick & Replansky, supra note 35, at 258.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
215. Flick & Replansky, supra note 213, at 258.
216. Id.
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those involved in making fundamental decisions."'217 A bank must be
aware of the threat of liability and work diligently with its staff to reduce
this potential for liability. A bank should focus on: (1) better training of
staff and other personnel (including more legal education through advice
of counsel); (2) careful and prudent draftsmanship of documents; (3) pro-
viding full and fair disclosures; (4) careful management of the bank loan
portfolios and deposit accounts; and (5) improving information channels
between bank personnel. Until specific guidelines are established by the
legislature or clarified by the courts, these guidelines might assist banks
in preventing the imposition of fiduciary standards during this period of
uncertainty in the banking industry.
C. Proposed Guidelines
"The expanding complexity of the banking system and banking reg-
ulation and the growing competitive pressures in the banking market in-
crease the need for specific rules of conduct. Without such rules society
will accomplish little, if anything, in terms of deterrence and preven-
tion." '218 Assuming that a bank may be regarded by the court as a fiduci-
ary, the court must carefully describe when, where, how and why the
bank becomes a fiduciary. The lawmakers should adopt tests or stan-
dards for an accurate and precise description of the bank's duties and
responsibilities to the borrower.
Since the concept of fiduciary duty is an equitable one, precise defi-
nitions and strict parameters on the relationship cannot be established
for use in all cases. However, there are certain broad rules and principles
which should be applied when determining whether a fiduciary relation-
ship exists in any particular bank-borrower situation. The general test
should be as follows:
A fiduciary relationship exists between a bank and its depositor
or loan customer if:
(a) the customer justifiably reposes trust and confidence in
the bank and reasonably believes that the bank will act, in all
respects, solely to protect the customer's interests, and will do
nothing adverse to the customer's best interests in the transac-
tion, and
(b) the bank knows or has reason to know that the cus-
tomer is reposing such trust and confidence in it, and the bank
accepts this.
217. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 210, at 809.
218. Id.
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From this, the court should establish standards of "justifiable" re-
posing of trust and confidence, "reasonable" belief and acceptance or no-
tice of such reliance. The standards should differ, depending on the type
of customer.2 9
1. Consumer v. commercial customers
When determining whether a customer reasonably/justifiably re-
posed trust and confidence in the bank, a court should differentiate be-
tween consumer and commercial customers. "A fiduciary's duty must be
defined with reference to the experience and intelligence of the person to
whom the duty is owed."' 220 Though it is difficult to determine the sub-
jective knowledge and understanding of a customer, there are customers
who should be held to a higher standard of knowledge and understand-
ing. For instance, the vice president in charge of finance at General Mo-
tors should be assumed to have greater knowledge of loan transactions
than a consumer applying for a home improvement loan. Commercial
borrowers should be held to a higher standard of knowledge and under-
standing because businesses are better equipped to protect themselves.22
Less sophisticated consumers generally place more trust and confidence
in banks than do commercial borrowers.
In several fiduciary cases in which the borrower was victorious, the
borrower was a consumer.222 These cases emphasized that the borrower
was a long-time customer and trusted the bank as a friend. In cases
where the bank was victorious, the courts have held that the customer
was "capable of independent business judgment." '223 However, the plain-
219. See supra text accompanying notes 185-91.
220. Midland Nat'l Bank v. Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d 404, 413 (Minn. 1980); see also First
Nat'l Bank v. International Machs. Corp., 279 Minn. 188, 156 N.W.2d 86 (1968). Interna-
tional Machines involved a dispute between corporate officers and a bank. The court held:
[A]ppellants were knowledgeable businessmen who understood the nature of the ob-
ligation which they assumed. As shareholders and directors of the corporation, it
may be assumed that they benefitted directly from the loan. It cannot be denied that
they knew they were to be held responsible in accordance with the terms of the in-
struments which they signed.
Id. at 193, 156 N.W.2d at 88-89; see also MacKenzie v. Summit Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 116,
119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (bank had no reason to believe that corporate officer was relying on
it to advise and counsel him and, therefore, had no fiduciary obligation to disclose certain facts
about transaction). See supra note 180 for a discussion of MacKenzie.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73, 177-79.
222. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Lennox v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970), dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying notes 54-57, 171-73; Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49
Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 58-62, 174-76; Deist
v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 64-70.
223. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218
(1976), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 71-73, 177-79; Denison State Bank v. Ma-
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tiffs in both Commercial Cotton v. United California Bank224 and Barrett
v. Bank of America22 were business customers. Both plaintiffs dealt with
the bank on a commercial level and should have been held to a higher
standard of knowledge and understanding. Business people or commer-
cial customers are generally able to protect themselves and are capable of
exercising independent business judgment.
The author does not suggest that a bank should always be held to a
fiduciary duty to its "consumers" nor does it suggest that a bank should
never be held as fiduciary to "commercial" depositors and borrowers.
Rather, a court should apply varying standards to determine if the cus-
tomer's reposing of trust and confidence in the bank was reasonable.
Then the plaintiff must satisfy the second part of the test which requires
that the bank know or have reason to know that the customer was plac-
ing his trust and confidence in the bank and the bank accepts this. The
burden of proof should rest on the party seeking to impose the duty.
This Comment suggests that a commercial borrower's claim of "trust
and confidence" should be closely scrutinized because it has "knowledge
of the market place" and is in a better position to protect his own inter-
ests. Just as the UCC adopted separate standards for merchants and
consumers, the courts or the legislature should also adopt different stan-
dards for the distinct types of bank customers.226
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated that, in recent years, the courts
have struggled to apply fiduciary principles to bank-depositor and bank-
borrower relationships. The fiduciary concept has been inadequately de-
fined, in hindsight, by judges and juries. As a result, banks and their
customers have been denied any type of guidelines or standards to follow
which are essential in the mass handling of the millions of accounts and
loans in the banking industry.
Courts and legislatures need to step back and analyze the "fiduci-
ary" concept before introducing it into the bank-depositor or bank-bor-
rower relationship. To carefully develop the parameters of a bank's
responsibilities, the creators and interpreters of our laws need to balance
deira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 74-81,
181-83; Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986), discussed supra at text accompany-
ing notes 82-85.
224. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1985).
225. Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986).
226. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-104 (1976).
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the customer's interest in freedom from misrepresentation and bad faith,
with the bank's interests in freedom to function in a competitive com-
mercial market and operate in its own best interest. A bank's liability
should be kept within reasonable limits and consistent with the duties it
has accepted. The ever increasing willingness to pursue new forms of
commercial liability should not result in the application of a "watered
down" version of established fiduciary principles. In order to avoid this
impropriety, courts should refrain from injecting the law of fiduciaries
into the bank-depositor and bank-borrower relationships.
Kenneth W. Curtis
